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AbstrAct
Objective Taxation equitably reduces smoking, the 
leading cause of health inequalities. The tobacco industry 
(TI) can, however, undermine the public health gains 
realised from tobacco taxation through its pricing 
strategies. This study aims to examine contemporary TI 
pricing strategies in the UK and implications for tobacco 
tax policy.
Design Review of commercial literature and 
longitudinal analysis of tobacco sales and price data.
setting A high-income country with comprehensive 
tobacco control policies and high tobacco taxes (UK).
Participants 2009 to 2015 Nielsen Scantrak electronic 
point of sale systems data.
Main outcome measures Tobacco segmentation; 
monthly prices, sales volumes of and net revenue from 
roll-your-own (RYO) and factory-made (FM) cigarettes by 
segment; use of price-marking and pack sizes.
results The literature review and sales data concurred 
that both RYO and FM cigarettes were segmented by 
price. Despite regular tax increases, average real prices 
for the cheapest FM and RYO segments remained 
steady from 2013 while volumes grew. Low prices were 
maintained through reductions in the size of packs and 
price-marking. Each year, at the point the budget is 
implemented, the TI drops its revenue by up to 18 pence 
per pack, absorbing the tax increases (undershifting). 
Undershifting is most marked for the cheapest 
segments.
conclusions The TI currently uses a variety of 
strategies to keep tobacco cheap. The implementation 
of standardised packaging will prevent small pack sizes 
and price-marking but further changes in tax policy are 
needed to minimise the TI’s attempts to prevent sudden 
price increases.
IntrODuctIOn
Tobacco tax increases are the most effective and 
inexpensive way of reducing tobacco smoking 
prevalence,1–9 consumption,10 11 initiation12 13 
and inequalities in smoking.14–17 Previous work 
revealed that, between 2000 and 2009 in the UK, 
the tobacco industry (TI) differentially shifted tax 
increases—absorbing tax increases on the cheapest 
cigarettes to keep them cheap (undershifting) 
while overshifting taxes on more expensive ciga-
rettes to maximise profits.18–20 Consequently, the 
price of the lowest priced brands remained steady 
in real terms and the range between the cheapest 
and most expensive cigarettes increased. Similar 
TI pricing strategies have now been confirmed 
in other jurisdictions21–23 implying that this is an 
area of global concern.
Tobacco companies have been introducing 
increasing numbers of lower priced prod-
ucts21–23and more smokers, particularly the 
poorest,9 24 are now smoking these cheaper facto-
ry-made (FM)21 25–27 and roll-your-own (RYO) 
cigarettes.9 25–27 Evidence indicates that the avail-
ability of cheap tobacco reduces motivation to 
quit and quit success.28–30 This strategy is there-
fore likely to be driving inequalities in smoking 
and negating the intended benefits of tobacco 
taxation.18–20
Objectives
Our previous 2000–2009 study18–20 examined 
only packs of 20 FM cigarettes using bi-annual 
data. Nothing is yet published on RYO price 
segmentation or what other pricing approaches 
the TI is now using. Little is also known about 
how prices vary through the year in response to 
tax increases. This study therefore aims to address 
these gaps by analysing commercial literature, 
monthly price sales and tax data to determine 
the strategies the TI is currently using to keep 
FM and RYO tobacco cheap including the extent 
and patterns of undershifting. Given the lack of 
research in this area and growing rates of RYO use 
in diverse jurisdictions, the results will be globally 
relevant.
background
In the UK, three types of tax are applied to 
tobacco: specific tax (a fixed amount per 1000 
cigarettes or 1000 g of RYO tobacco), ad valorem 
tax (a proportion of the retail price) and value 
added tax (VAT, another ad valorem tax applied 
to most goods and services). Compared with ad 
valorem taxes, specific taxes tend to narrow the 
price range between premium and value brands, 
maximise the impact of tobacco taxes31–33 and 
raise more revenue.34 Since our previous project, 
UK tobacco taxes have increased annually, their 
structure has changed somewhat and the rate 
of VAT has varied (table 1). Most notably, since 
March 2010, tax increases between 1% and 5% 
above inflation have been specified each year for 
all tobacco products.35 In 2011, the UK increased 
the relative contribution of specific versus ad 
valorem tax for FM cigarettes36 and specified 
greater increases in taxes on RYO in an attempt 
to close the gap between FM and RYO prices. All 
tax changes were enacted annually each March 
with the exception of the 2009 change which took 
place in April.
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MethODs
review of commercial literature
A review of the commercial literature covering 2008–2014 was 
undertaken in order to explore how the TI was pricing its prod-
ucts, including the price segmentation used and whether other 
approaches were used to keep tobacco cheap or alter its price. 
Mentions of tobacco pricing and segments between 2008 and 
2014 were collated from: tobacco company annual reports and 
presentations to investors; financial analyst reports; market 
reports (Euromonitor, Mintel, Keynote) and trade magazines 
(Retail News, The Grocer, Wholesale News and Tobacco Journal 
International), plus relevant articles from Forecourt Trader, 
Convenience store and Asian Trader (2014 only) collated for a 
related literature review. Finally, the segment descriptors identi-
fied in the literature were used as search terms in a  Google. co. 
uk search.
sales and price data
Monthly Nielsen Scantrak data from January 2009 to December 
2015 for the UK were used. Such data are collected every time 
an electronic barcode of FM cigarettes, RYO and make your own 
(MYO, where smokers own a machine which assembles ciga-
rettes) tobacco is scanned via electronic point of sale system37 
during purchase at a sales point in a participating retailer. 
Nielsen collect sales data from 87% of Great Britain’s supermar-
kets, 15% of its convenience stores (including 83% supermar-
ket-owned convenience stores, 59% forecourts, 6% convenience 
store chains and 4% independents) and 17% of Northern Ireland 
stores with grocery sales (Northern Ireland represents 2.8% of 
the UK population38). This includes 100% of the big four UK 
supermarkets (Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda and Morrison). For other 
stores, stratified random sampling with replacement is used.39 
These Scantrak data are then modelled so that they are repre-
sentative of the UK using expansion factors based on the region, 
shop type and shop company.39
Like other products, tobacco brands can be arranged within 
a hierarchical architecture (see online  supplementary table S1). 
Drawing on existing hierarchies,40–42 we used the following 
four-level hierarchy: brand (eg, Marlboro), brand family (eg, 
Marlboro Bright Leaf), brand variant (eg, Marlboro Bright Leaf 
Platinum) and, at the lowest level, stock keeping unit (SKU) (eg, 
Marlboro Bright Leaf Platinum 10 stick pack, single pack, price 
marked). Nielsen data were provided at SKU level, each SKU 
identifiable via an individual bar code.
For each SKU, Nielsen identifies the brand family and variant, 
the number of sticks per pack for FM and grams per pack for 
RYO, whether sold in a single or multipack and (from August 
2011) whether sold in a price marked pack. Data available 
for each month included: the total value of sales per SKU, the 
price per SKU, the number of SKUs sold, from August 2011 the 
number of FM sticks and kilos of RYO sold and from January 
2013 the proportion of retailers to which each SKU was distrib-
uted. Data were analysed using SPSS V.22 and Microsoft Excel 
2013.
segmentation
Consistent with our previous study,20 SKUs were allocated to 
price segments and price segment labels were identified based 
on the commercial literature review and an analysis of their rela-
tive pricing each month. Details are provided in online supple-
mentary file 1.
Analysis of pricing and volumes
Having allocated SKUs to segments, we explored prices, volumes, 
use of price-marking and variation in pack sizes by segment. In 
order to lessen small number anomalies, analyses were restricted 
to SKUs which reached a market share of >0.008% for at least 
3 months (see online supplementary table S2).
Weighted average real prices
Weighted average real prices20 by segment were calculated by 
weighting for volumes sold and adjusting for inflation (thus 
creating real prices) using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).43 For 
each segment, we assessed pack and stick prices. For the latter, 
one RYO stick was set to contain 0.5 g tobacco based on the 
table 1 Tobacco-related tax changes and inflation during the study period
budget stipulated tax changes81–87 tax rates36 88
Inflation: 12 month
% changes*89
All tobacco FM only rYO only FM rYO
VAT† Ad valorem Specific Specific
% pack price % pack price
£ per 1000 
sticks £ per kg CPI RPI
Budget enactment
22 April 2009 2% increase 15.0 24.0 114.31 124.45 2.3 −1.2
24 March 2010 1% above inflation‡ 17.5 24.0 119.03 129.59 3.4 4.4
23 March 2011 2% above RPI Ad valorem: 24%–16.5%
Specific: 25% above RPI
+10% (total 12%) 
above RPI
20.0 16.5 154.95 151.90 4.0 5.3
21 March 2012 5% above RPI 20.0 16.5 167.41 164.11 3.5 3.6
20 March 2013 2% above RPI 20.0 16.5 176.22 172.74 2.8 3.3
19 March 2014 2% above RPI§ 20.0 16.5 184.10 180.46 1.6 2.5
18 March 2015 2% above RPI 20.0 16.5 189.49 185.74 0.0 0.9
*Although the RPI (a measure of private household spending from survey data) is still employed in relation to tobacco taxation changes,90 it was de-designated as a national 
statistic in March 2013 (10) and replaced with the CPI which meets international standards and is comparable with other European countries.91 The RPI, unlike the CPI, includes 
housing costs, is more volatile than the CPI and rises more quickly.92
†VAT (a sales tax) changes did not occur on budget days.88 Changes occurred as follows: 01.01.2010 (17.5%), 04.01.2011 (20%).
‡2% above inflation for next 4 years.
§2% above inflation until end of next parliament.
CPI, Consumer Price Index; FM, factory made; RPI, Retail Price Index; RYO, roll your own; VAT, value added tax.
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latest available survey data showing this is the average weight per 
RYO stick in England44 and the UK.45 For pack prices, prelimi-
nary analysis showed that pricing patterns over time for different 
pack sizes were similar, so data on all pack sizes were pooled to 
calculate weighted average real prices by segment for FM and 
RYO.
Impact of 2011 budget on RYO pricing
To understand whether the 2011 budget was successful in its 
objective of raising RYO prices, we compared the median 
monthly price rise in each RYO segment immediately after the 
2011 budget enactment with median monthly price rises imme-
diately following the other budget enactments and across the 
data series as a whole.
Volumes
As pack sizes changed over time, we assessed changes in sales 
volumes of FM and RYO over time using the number of sticks 
sold (again based on 0.5 g of tobacco per RYO stick). We assessed 
volumes in the tobacco market as a whole, for FM and RYO and 
by segment.
Pack size and price-marking
To examine changes in pack size over time, we identified popular 
pack sizes and calculated the market share by pack size for each 
segment annually over the study period. We explored patterns 
in the use of price-marking (printing the price on the pack, 
normally in bright bold font) by calculating the percentage of 
price marked packs by segment and pack size each month. We 
also calculated real weighted average prices (as above) and the 
% difference between the prices of price marked and non-price-
marked packs in each segment.
Analysis of tax pass through
Tax pass through, the extent to which tax increases are passed 
through to consumers via increases in prices, or absorbed by 
companies through reduced profits, was evaluated through 
estimating changes in net revenue per pack. Net revenue is 
the money the company retains from its sales once all tobacco 
taxes and VAT have been paid. From this net revenue, compa-
nies cover their costs of production and distribution with the 
remainder being profits. As such, any tax rises not pushed onto 
consumers reduce net revenue and profits earned. The govern-
ment specifies tax changes in the annual budget (which occurred 
in March in all of the study years except 2009 when it was April 
(table 1)). Tobacco tax changes were implemented at the time 
of the budget enactments but VAT changes occurred in January 
2010 and January 2011.
The taxes for each pack (ad valorem, specific and VAT) were 
calculated and summed to deduce the total tax due (see online 
supplementary file 2 for methodology). This was then subtracted 
from the nominal pack price to estimate net revenue. Real net 
revenue was calculated by adjusting for inflation using the CPI 
and presented graphically by year and segment to examine 
patterns over time.
To examine the extent to which taxes were passed to consumers 
following each budget enactment and whether this varied by 
segment and the size of the tax increase, the net revenue per pack 
(in pence) for the month immediately prior to the tax increase 
was subtracted from the net revenue for the next month (up to 
the next budget) to estimate the change in net revenue. Changes 
for all pack sizes were graphed and showed similar patterns. We 
therefore only present changes in revenue for a popular pack 
sizes (20 s for FM premium and mid-price, 19 s for FM value and 
subvalue, and 12.5 g for RYO).
results
review of commercial literature
Growing demand for cheaper tobacco and the launch of addi-
tional cheap products (in both FM and RYO markets) were 
consistently reported during the study period.46 In 2012, Impe-
rial Tobacco announced the creation of a new FM segment priced 
below existing segments, labelled ‘subvalue’.47 To encourage 
smokers to remain brand loyal,48 existing brands were extended 
with new SKUs introduced in lower priced FM segments49 or as 
RYO.50 New segmentation within RYO was also noted51 52 with 
RYO SKUs often introduced in lower priced segments.53
In addition to the creation of new, lower price segments, 
price-marking was used to sell selected SKUs at a cheaper price.54 
This strategy was particularly noted for RYO55 and cheaper FM 
brands.56 Low pack prices were also maintained by cutting the 
amount sold per pack, for example from 20 to 19 sticks57 or 
launching smaller 10 g RYO packs.58 Other strategies included 
repricing brands from a high to a low segment,53 including 
papers and filters inside RYO tobacco packs (known as combi-
packs59) and launching MYO tobacco.60 Thus, more options 
were made available to smokers looking for cheap tobacco.
segmentation
Based on the commercial literature review and analysis of the 
price data, we created three segments for both FM and RYO: 
‘premium’, ‘mid-price’ and ‘value’, with the addition, from 
2012 onwards, of a fourth ‘subvalue’ segment in the FM market 
(see online supplementary table S3).
Analysis of pricing and volumes
Weighted average real prices
Price per pack
When examining real pack prices, the prices of FM and RYO 
products in the premium and mid-price segments were similar 
(figure 1A). In contrast, the price of the value RYO packs was 
considerably lower than value FM packs. Around the time of the 
2011 tax increase on RYO, the price per pack of RYO premium 
and mid-price segments began to follow the respective FM pack 
prices rather than being cheaper. The gap between value FM and 
RYO packs also narrowed at this time but had widened by the 
end of the data series.
Across the data series as a whole, the range in price per pack 
between the most and least expensive products within both FM 
and RYO increased. This is particularly so since 2012/2013 and 
is largely due to stagnation in the price of the cheapest products 
(figure 1A and online supplementary table S4). From January 
2013 to December 2015, the real prices of the FM subvalue 
products actually fell 7 p and RYO value packs only increased 
by 2 p whereas the prices of premium FM and RYO products 
increased by £1.09 and £1.16, respectively.
Price per stick
When comparing prices by stick, RYO sticks were considerably 
cheaper than FM (figure 1B). The increasing price range within 
the FM and RYO markets also occurred for stick prices. For 
example, the price range between cheapest and most expensive 
RYO segment widened from 10 p to 16 p per stick and for FM 
widened from 7 p to 13 p. This reflected smaller price increases 
in the cheaper segments. However, price increases were seen in 
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every segment suggesting the fall in price of subvalue packs is 
attributable to the declining number of sticks per pack.
Prices per stick also increased much faster among FM than 
RYO with the exception of subvalue FM. Thus, the range 
between the highest (FM premium) and lowest priced segments 
(RYO value) grew over time (£1.74 in January 2009 to £2.48 in 
December 2015).
After the 2011 budget, when the emphasis of tobacco tax 
changed towards specific taxation, the gap between the FM 
premium and FM value segments declined from a high of 7.9 p 
per stick in January 2011 to 6.6 p in February 2012. After this 
point, the subvalue segment brands began to be introduced. 
Moreover, prices per stick of all three RYO segments rose by 
their highest amount after the 2011 budget enactment-premium 
rose 0.72 p, mid-price rose 0.65 p and value rose 0.42 p in April 
2011 compared with median monthly rises of 0.03 p, 0.04 p and 
0.03 p, respectively overall and median monthly post budget 
rises of  0.20 p, 0.19 p and 0.07 p, respectively in the rest of the 
data period).
Volumes
Overall the total volume of FM and RYO sticks sold declined 
markedly in the UK: from 50.5 billion sticks in 2009 to 
42.6 billion sticks in 2015 (a 13% decline) (figure 2A and 
online supplementary table S5). However, this overall decline 
consisted of a 17% decline in FM stick sales but a 46% increase 
for RYO sales, although RYO sales stabilised post-2012. Seasonal 
effects are apparent in both FM and RYO—New Year’s resolu-
tions (and/or post-Christmas penury) impact tobacco sales.
Changes in volumes of FM and RYO sticks sold varied by 
segment (figure 2B and online supplementary table S6). Within 
FM, annual volumes of premium and mid-price products declined 
markedly throughout the period (54% and 61% declines, respec-
tively). Volumes of FM value cigarettes grew by 126% over the 
study period although growth slowed from mid-2011. From 
their introduction in 2012, volumes of FM subvalue have grown 
to 4.3 billion sticks in 2015. Within RYO, from 2009 to 2015 
premium sales declined by 43% while mid-price volumes grew 
by 78% overall although have been stagnant since 2013 and 
RYO value grew to 2.3 billion stick equivalents although growth 
slowed after 2012.
Thus, the market share of segments varied considerably over 
the study period. FM mid-price and RYO premium were the 
most popular of each type of product at the beginning of the 
study period whereas at the end of the study period FM value 
and RYO mid-price were most popular.
Pack size
FM
The variety of FM pack sizes increased over the study period most 
notably with the introduction of increasingly smaller pack sizes 
(17–19 stick packs) to an increasing number of brands (figure 3 
and online supplementary table S7). Market share of traditional 
FM 20 stick packs declined in all segments but most markedly in 
the value and subvalue segments where, by 2015, only 1% and 
0% of volume, respectively were 20-packs. By 2015, the pack 
size with the largest share was 18 sticks for the subvalue segment 
(46% share), 19 sticks for the value segment (45% share) and 10 
sticks for the mid-price segment (45% share).
RYO
The most notable change in the RYO segment was the gradual 
advent of smaller, 10 g packs in recent years. This was seen most 
markedly in the mid-price and RYO value segments. For example, 
RYO mid-price 10 g packs increased from a 1% to 17% market 
share between 2009 and 2015. Throughout the study period, 
12.5 g packs held the largest market share in all RYO segments 
but over time, this market share fell for all segments; for example, 
RYO premium 12.5 g packs declined from 62% market share in 
Figure 1 Real price per pack and stick for RYO and FM (single packs only-all pack sizes)*. *The price of subvalue packs appears unstable initially as 
different pack sizes were introduced. FM, factory made; RYO, roll your own.
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2009 to 54% market share in 2015. Generally, the market share 
of largest pack size (50 g) grew slightly over the study period. For 
example, RYO premium 50 g packs increased from 8% market 
share in 2009 to 11% market share in 2015.
Price-marking
Cheaper segments were more likely to be price marked than 
expensive segments (figure 4A and online supplementary table 
S9A). For example, between 60% and 100% of subvalue FM 
products were price marked compared with a negligible propor-
tion of premium FM products. Patterns for RYO products were 
similar although a higher proportion of premium RYO products 
were price marked (36% in 2012 and about 25% thereafter) than 
premium FM products. Half of RYO value products were price 
marked. Differences between prices of price marked and stan-
dard packs varied over time and between segments (see online 
supplementary table S10).
Figure 2 Volumes of sticks of FM sticks and RYO tobacco sold (A) overall and (B) by price segment. FM, factory made; RYO, roll your own.
Figure 3 Market share of major FM and RYO pack sizes.  FM, factory made; RYO, roll your own.
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For RYO, but not FM, smaller packs were also more likely to 
be price marked than larger packs (figure 4B and online supple-
mentary table S9). For most segments and pack sizes price-
marking appeared to increase gradually over time. However, 
there were notable exceptions to this pattern. When the new 
subvalue FM brands were introduced in early 2012, 100% were 
price marked but this then fell rapidly to between 60% and 70%. 
There was substantial price-marking of 10 g RYO packs prior to 
growth in the mid-price segment (2011) and when 10 g packs 
were introduced into the value segment (2013) (figure 3B). In 
addition, price marking on premium brands in both FM and 
RYO segments has fallen.
tax pass through
Net real revenues were considerably greater for higher than 
lower priced segments although the gap was more marked for 
FM than RYO segments (figure 5 and online supplementary file 
table S11). A cyclical pattern of a drop in revenue immediately 
postbudget emerged with the 2011 budget and from this point 
there was progressively more differentiation in revenue between 
segments. Within the premium segment, revenue was greater on 
FM than RYO products while in the value segment, this pattern 
reversed and net revenues in the cheapest FM segment did 
increase throughout the whole period.
Declines in net revenue at times of tax (VAT or tobacco tax) 
increases can be seen more clearly using changes in net revenue 
postbudget (figure 6 and online supplementary file table S12). 
A decline in revenue postbudget indicates undershifting (ie, 
the industry has absorbed the tax increase through a decline in 
profit) while an increase indicates overshifting (ie, the industry 
has increased profits on top of the tax increase). The point at 
which the change equals zero is the point at which the tax is fully 
shifted to consumers.
Every year and in every segment, in the month after the 
budget, net revenues fell. Thus, tobacco tax changes were not 
passed straight onto consumers but were initially absorbed by 
tobacco companies (indicating slightly lower profit per pack). 
In general, the extent and duration of the undershifting was 
greatest in the lowest segments while in higher priced segments 
the undershifting was less marked and often short-lived with 
profits recovering to and then exceeded prebudget levels (indi-
cating overshifting) within 1–3 months each year. For example, 
in 2014, revenue on premium FM products recovered to 
prebudget levels by May and by the end of the budget year was 
up by 23 pence. By contrast, revenues on subvalue FM products 
fell in 2014 until August, and though they increased thereafter, 
never recovered to prebudget levels.
Figure 4 Percentage of packs price marked by (a) price segment and (b) pack size. Note: Nielsen data on price marking was only available from 
August 2011.  FM, factory made; RYO, roll your own.
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Patterns varied somewhat by year reflecting the different tax 
changes. The years April to March 2009 and 2010 both saw 
VAT increases in January 2010 and January 2011, respectively. 
The declines in revenue at both these points indicate these VAT 
increases were absorbed by tobacco companies.
The years 2011 and 2012 saw the most marked tax changes—
2011 saw a shift to, and significant increase in, specific duties 
and a marked increase in the tax on RYO, while March 2012 saw 
an increase in taxes of 5% above Retail Price Index (compared 
with 1% increase in 2010 and 2% increases in other years in the 
data series). In line with this, after the 2011 tax system changes, 
a more marked pattern of initial undershifting and greater differ-
entiation in revenue change by segment emerged consistent with 
the widening revenue gap between segments.
DIscussIOn
This is the first study to provide a comprehensive overview of 
TI pricing including tax shifting throughout the year in both 
the FM and RYO markets. The commercial literature review 
and Nielsen data analysis both indicated that low priced FM 
and RYO tobacco products remained available throughout the 
study period via various pricing strategies including: launching 
new cheaper products; locking down the price of certain prod-
ucts through price-marking; introducing smaller packs and 
undershifting to ensure smaller price increases in the cheaper 
segments. Although real prices per stick have increased in all 
segments, real pack prices (and hence the price the consumer 
faces) of the cheapest FM and RYO products have remained 
static since 2012 largely due to the decline in pack sizes. Ten 
gram packs comprised a greater proportion of the cheapest 
RYO segments and were more likely to be price marked; thus 
the combination of small packs and price-marking appeared 
to be reinforcing. The price gap between FM and RYO was 
more complex: the gap in pack price appears to have narrowed 
between 2009 and 2012 particularly in the lowest segment (ie, 
between FM value and RYO value), signalling some success in 
using the 2011 tax changes to close the price gap. However, in 
terms of price per stick, the price gap increased across the dataset 
as a whole. Within RYO and FM, the range between cheapest 
and most expensive products has increased reflecting the differ-
ential shifting of taxes between segments. Hence, the opportuni-
ties for downtrading have continued to increase and volumes of 
the cheapest segments have grown in both FM and RYO.
TI pricing appears designed to deliberately undermine the 
public health impact of tax increases. Each year, immediately 
postbudget, the TI cuts its profits by absorbing the tax increases 
and thus preventing any sudden increase in price the consumer 
would face, instead smoothing that increase throughout the year. 
The degree and duration of undershifting is, in general, most 
marked in the cheapest segments and in recent years is more 
Figure 5 Net real revenue per pack by price segment for popular pack sizes. FM, factory made; RYO, roll your own.
Figure 6 Change in net real revenue per pack postbudget (difference in revenue per pack in each postbudget month compared with budget month) 
by price segment for popular pack sizes. Note. A change <£0.00 indicates undershifting and a change >£0.00 indicates overshifting. FM value 20 stick 
pack shown for 2009 because 19 stick pack was not available at the time of the budget VAT changes in January 2009 and January 2010. FM, factory 
made; RYO, roll your own.
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marked in FM than RYO. The industry then drives up profits 
later in the year with the extent of overshifting most marked 
in the more expensive price-segments. This approach to pricing 
means tobacco prices in the lowest segments are kept artificially 
low and leads to the growing gap in price between the most 
expensive and cheapest products.
Given that sudden large price rises are most associated with 
quit attempts,28 61 62 this pricing strategy and the consequent 
ongoing availability of cheap tobacco could reduce the incentive 
for price conscious smokers to quit.28–30 As such smokers are 
socioeconomically disadvantaged,9 this is likely to significantly 
exacerbate inequalities:14–17 UK data from October 2016 show 
smoking prevalence remains higher among the more disadvan-
taged (23.7%) compared with the more affluent (14.3%).63 As 
smoking is the leading cause of health inequalities64 this has 
significant implications.
limitations
Nielsen data are developed primarily for commercial purposes 
but are increasingly being used for academic research in several 
countries,10 65–68 and Nielsen tobacco data have been validated 
as having potential to enhance policy evaluation.69 Nielsen 
Scantrak data include only legitimate sales from UK grocery 
stores. However, such sales comprise up to 80% of the total 
market (legal and illicit) and illicit and non-grocery store sales 
are declining.45 70
The prices we used for RYO cigarettes include only tobacco, 
not papers or filters. Currently papers cost between 0.2 and 0.6 p 
each and filters between 0.2 and 0.8 p each,71 72 adding between 
0.4 p and 1.4 p per cigarette.
We also note that price changes could (in part) have been 
caused by wider changes in the competitive landscape. This seems 
relatively unlikely: although there has been growth in e-cigarette 
sales, by 2015 the e-cigarette market had only reached a twen-
tieth of the size of the tobacco market in the UK.73 Addition-
ally, the tobacco market has remained dominated by the four 
Transnational Tobacco companies which collectively accounted 
for over 90% of the market, with only relatively small changes 
in their respective market shares.74
Policy implications
Government tax authorities need to consider both the pack 
price confronting smokers in a retail environment and the 
price per stick. Prices (and profits) per stick can rise but by 
altering pack sizes, the industry can minimise the price rises 
consumers face. Minimal price increases were also occurring 
in segments with higher levels of price-marking. This paper 
therefore provides support for implementing standardised pack 
sizes of FM and RYO, banning price marked packs and other 
forms of price promotion. Standardised packaging legislation 
in the UK75 and the EU Tobacco Products Directive,76 both 
introduced in May 2016, preclude the use of price-marking 
and fix minimum pack sizes at 20 sticks FM and 30 g RYO. 
Our data show that in 2015 90% of packs within each RYO 
segment were under 30 g. As such these requirements will lead 
to marked changes in available pack sizes. In addition to anal-
ysis of the impacts of these changes, qualitative work may be 
needed to explore the impact of larger pack sizes on smokers 
attempting to quit, given that smokers wanting to quit prefer 
smaller packs.77
The industry’s ability to introduce new cheaper variants 
of existing products40 could be restricted by allowing only 
one variant per brand as is the case with new legislation from 
Uruguay42 78 and/or freezing the introduction of any new FM or 
RYO brands which could be part of an ‘End-game’ strategy.
The increase in tax on RYO in the 2011 budget had some 
success in narrowing the gap in the price between FM and RYO 
equivalent packs (despite the marked undershifting in the RYO 
value segment that year). However, a gap in price between 
product types still exists and is particularly marked when exam-
ining prices per stick. This and the fact that, within the value/
subvalue segments, the degree of undershifting is now lower and 
profitability higher for RYO than FM, suggests there is scope for 
a further tax increase on RYO.
The marked price differentials within the RYO and FM 
markets which arise from the TI’s differential shifting of taxes 
between segments also need to be addressed. The minimum 
excise tax,79 80 implemented in May 2017 should prevent 
tobacco being sold below a price floor, and these results suggest 
that this or a minimum consumption tax (which includes VAT) 
should be considered elsewhere. Within FM, a further shift to 
specific taxes would help.
In addition, since the TI appears to be minimising sudden 
price rises which are more effective in stimulating quitting,28 61 62 
the timing of tax increases could be made less predictable to 
make it harder for the industry to use pricing to undermine their 
public health impact. Furthermore, the government could stip-
ulate only a couple of dates per year when price rises could be 
made to help ensure each tax increase is passed on in a timely 
manner and consider larger tax increases in anticipation of 
industry undershifting.
In summary, cheap tobacco has been made available in the UK 
through TI strategies of absorbing tax increases in the cheapest 
segments, introducing new cheaper products, price-marking and 
reducing pack size for both FM and RYO. New approaches are 
needed, such as fully specific taxation, tax increases on RYO, 
restricting brands to one variant and preventing the introduction 
of new brands. Internationally, a minimum excise or consump-
tion tax and standardisation of packs (to include a minimum 
pack size or weight and prevent price marking) is recommended.
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recommended.
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